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Rational Agency and Moral Practice: 
An Exploration of Dual Constraints 
 
Abstract  
 
A number of actions performed by a large number of persons are often characterized by 
apathy, impulsivity and goal-neglect in contemporary times. While being fully capable of 
exercising the theoretical reasoning consistent with their desires and beliefs, an increasing 
number of persons generally fail to take into account the necessity of practical reasoning 
focused on valuing the other-regarding responsibility, duty and obligation. They are 
endowed with the faculty of theoretical rationality and yet they have no regard for the 
necessity of deliberation about and valuation of future consequences of an action. In such a 
case, the apathetic and goal-neglecting impulsive persons fail to properly execute actions. 
What is at stake is that apathetic disposition and impulsive intentionality constrains the 
working of the relation of emotion, reason and thought towards purposeful action and 
moral doing. It needs to be acknowledged that agential autonomy of human nature and 
voluntary nature of human actions as these are mediated through practical reason have an 
intimate relation with the health of human brain and the richness of information it is 
endowed with. What is nowadays increasingly observed as human actions driven by socially 
pervasive undesirable whims and reprehensible impulses may often be simply the result of 
malfunction of cognitive control of brain over internal information and asymmetry in 
coupling of external information with brain. A human agent suffering from apathy, 
impulsivity and goal-neglect may not be successful in bringing the cognitive reason and 
perceptual information to leave a stamp on his/her moral practices in day to day life. Such 
a situation may allow for manifold standards of moral practices in the real world. Such a 
multiplicity in the practices of morality is tragically not always accounted in theories of 
ethics. It must however be accounted.  
 
Classical postulates on the concept of a rational agency and the rationalist claim regarding 
universality of the practical reason needs to account for the general observations of at least 
two pervasive real-life constraints on moral practices since these dual constraints produce 
exceptions in standard moral practices. One is grounded in observations of pervasive 
apathy, and another derives from the phenomena of impulsivity and goal-neglect on part of 
a large number of people. Whereas apathy may often be caused by malfunction of cognitive 
control function of the pre-frontal cortex and corti-costriatal circuitry of the human 
brain, goal neglect may largely be the result of asymmetry in coupling and transferring of 
perceptual data and external information to human brain. In case of lesions of and damages 
to the pre-frontal cortex of brain, malfunctioning of the cognitive control functions begins 
and, inter alia, the human agents begin suffering from apathy. In case of irregularity in the 
functioning of corti-costriatal brain circuitry, the processing of reward-related (internal and 
external) informational resources is hampered and, inter alia, the human agents witness 
losing control over the process of regulation of impulsive decisions and actions. Both 
situations are symptomatic of the ‘psychic akinesia’ (also called ‘athymormia’) - auto-
activation deficit. 
 
Key Words: agency, apathy, auto-activation deficit, corti-costriatal brain circuitry, cognitive 
psychology, goal-neglect, impulsivity, morality and moral practices, practical reason, pre-frontal cortex, 
rationality.  
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Introduction 
 
In analytical philosophy, a moral practice is not merely a virtue but an indispensable identity of 
an agency. A moral practice is conceived to be the result of ethical disposition to act on the part 
of an agency. It is argued in the tradition of rationalist morality that a rational human agency is 
necessarily identified with sound moral practices. A moral practice is a set of consistently 
repeated actions, which are motivated by a reason explicable in terms of a spirit of virtue and a 
sense of care for others in the surrounding and whose contents are evaluated and judged to be 
either good or right or obligatory in nature. It is argued that there are normative forces inherent 
in the reason of an agency which demands a specific type of actions to be repeatedly undertaken 
in a consistent manner so as to constitute a moral practice. Given the acceptance of such 
concepts of rationality in association with morality, a rational agent by virtue of being swayed 
over by the categorical imperative is inevitably a moral agent. 
  
In the arena of real-life observation and experience, there are however a number of frequently 
occurring instances of goal-neglect, apathy and impulsivity as aberrations in moral practices on 
part of an otherwise rational agency that in turn result in utter disregard for considerations of 
other-regarding interests and needs. Skirting the demands of obligation, not keeping the 
promises and executing actions with utter disregard for the concern of goodness and 
righteousness have become persistent observations in day-to-day actually lived life. In modern 
contemporaneous times, the deviations from moral practices have become quite pervasive. Such 
real-life pervasive deviations from the sound moral practices are enough evidences for the 
breakdown of claims regarding the co-existentiality of morality and rationality in a project of a 
rational design of human life. The Greek moral philosophy did not go beyond “akrasia” or 
‘weaknesses of the will’ in explaining the digression and divergence from moral course of action. 
In a Kantian framework of moral philosophy, such aberrations have not been convincingly 
accommodated. Whatever other explanations exist in the literature, these also do not go very 
far.  
 
The philosophical psychology has some promises in accounting for diversions and deviations of 
practices as constraints on morality. While the abstract, conceptual and theoretical investigation 
of the categories of agency, reason and morality and rationalist theoretical paradigms is 
important in analytical philosophy, the significance of philosophical psychology for ethical 
analysis is not to be underestimated. In popular image, the reach of ethics is rather wide enough 
to be responsive to empirical facts and evidence provided by researchers in social psychology 
and neurology. There has been an old relation of ethics with philosophical psychology since the 
latter has been concerned with the empirical investigation of the facts and evidence. It is 
possible in the domain of philosophical psychology to explain the pervasive modern-life 
phenomenon of goal-neglect, impulsivity and apathy on part of a large number of human 
beings. Since mind (brain plus intentionality plus something) is quintessential the medium 
through the categories of which a human agency reasons, the health of brain matters in the 
formation of ethical disposition to act. In a rational human agency, the formation of ethical 
disposition is ever posited to be a natural process; it is however never spontaneous. It has been 
argued long ago by the Greek philosopher, Aristotle that the formation of such dispositions 
needed proper education and careful upbringing. In addition to education and upbringing of a 
human agent, the status of the health of brain of an acting person is quite significant. A rational 
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agency who is already capable of exercising practical reasoning and who has also been brought 
up with background of a proper education may still fail to exhibit an ethical disposition and a 
moral practice, and such failures may have a relation with the minor and often disregarded 
malfunction of human brain. 
 
While presenting the classical postulates on the relation of agency, practical reason and morality 
in the philosophical conceptual format, the paper draws attention to the possibility of discord 
between the faculty of reason and the morality practices of humans. What is argued is simple: a 
person may suffer from impulsivity caused by irregularity in the information-perception 
refinement function of sense-organs. A person may also suffer from the phenomena of goal-
neglect and apathy which may simply be the result of lesion and damage afflicting the brain – an 
integral constitutive part of mind. In both cases, an otherwise rational agent suffers from what is 
technically called the ‘psychic akinesia’ and in ordinary language the ‘auto-activation deficit’. In the 
present paper, dual limits on thought and action, initially arising from the lesion in human brain 
and poverty of environmental information and finally reflected in the irregularities in the 
cognition control function of the human brain and the information-perception refinement 
function of sense-organs, are explored as double constraints in the practices of morality by an 
agency. 
 
 
1. Agency and Reason: An Intimate Relation  
 
An agency is considered to be a finite, embodied, historical person who responds to reasons. An 
agency has a desire, an intention and a goal and s/he seeks not just any means or the only means 
rather searches for the best means (Searle, 2001) while performing an action. A rational agency 
is not merely capable of responding to reasons but is also a doer of an action – a purposeful 
action explicated by a reason. Autonomy in desideration and deliberation and goal behind the 
intentional action are the two hallmarks of the identity of a rational agency. Classical postulates 
established a concord between human reason and human action through conception of a 
rational agency. It is through positioning ‘reason’ as mediating factitive entity that agential 
autonomy of human nature and voluntary nature of human actions are put forward as two 
principal postulates of classical formulations in moral philosophy. An agency is posited to be an 
entity, which is autonomous in deliberation and desideration, and whose action has an intimate 
relation with reason (Petit and Smith, 1993). It is this intimate relation between reason and 
action of a human person that makes for a rational agency.  
 
There is a long chain of connected reasoning which is advanced to establish the postulate. It 
begins with the assertion that a human is a person – possessed of a personality with 
individuality, a human is also an agency – endowed with free will (autonomy), and therefore, a 
human is a personal agency. A materialist account identifies a person with a body and bodily 
continuity. A Cartesian account identifies a person with immaterial substance of mind and 
mental or psychological continuity. A balanced view is that a person is an entity which 
necessarily has two dimensions – mind and body; a person admits both mental and bodily 
attributes. A person is  
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“a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing 
corporeal characteristics, a physical situation, etc are equally applicable to a single individual of that 
single type (Strawson, 1959, p. 102).  
 
In the tradition of hylomorphism of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, a person is neither 
reducible to some bundle of bodily characteristics nor psychological characteristics; a person is 
rather a body with a “form” – a body and a soul in causal contact with each other (the rational 
soul of the Greek tradition). In other words, a person is the locus of immaterial rational soul – 
the “form” – within the material being – the body who is a subject of conscious experiences and 
intentionality. After Thomas Aquinas (1999), the analytical Thomism has been the improved 
version carried forward by works of Elizabeth Anscombe, John Haldane and J F Ross.  
 
A human who is a person is also a deliberator and an actor. While being a deliberator and an 
actor, a human person is first and foremost essentially an agency. To make a human subject a 
rational agency, the weights of deliberation and forces of desideration must resonate in harmony 
(Petit and Smith, 1993). An agency is capable of responding to a reason and in whom reason 
and value necessarily resonate. Rationality requires not only the weights of deliberation but also 
the forces of disposition, and the disposition in turn is influenced by forces of desideration, for 
example, desire, wanting, and longing. As a deliberating and acting human person, (s)he is 
endowed with a disposition to act – a disposition to act in order to see the fructification of a 
project of a rational design of life. In other words, such an agency does not merely produce a 
purposeful action but is also disposed to produce that action – intentionality. According to 
Frantz Brentano (1973), “intentionality” is a mental state ‘about’ something, and this 
“aboutness” is a capacity of the mental state (beliefs, desires) to aim at, to point at and to be 
about something beyond itself. It requires a first-person subject to have a mental state for there 
being an “intrinsic” intentionality (Searle, 1983), a disposition to act and action by an agency. 
Since personal autonomy requires appropriate mental abilities, an adequate range of options, 
and independence (Raz, 1986), a personal agency always leaves behind a stamp of his/her 
distinct individuality in the execution of an action. The mainstream literature of ethics and moral 
philosophy postulate an intimate relation of reason with agency and thereby the moral practice. 
In a rational human personal agency, reason and value must necessarily resonate. A rational 
agency does not just have a goal but also a capacity to make an appraisal and choose a goal in 
the light of something. That something is a value that (s)he considers to be either a good or a 
right or an obligation.  
 
It is a fact that a human being is the animal that can both understand reasons and respond to 
reasons. A rational agency necessarily responds to reasons. A reason is rational deliberation in 
the form of searching, weighing, and inferring a conclusion, and therefore, a reason may just 
constitute an improved guideline – a sort of an adequately informed, reflectively endorsed 
practical consideration. Facts give us reasons when they count in favor of our having some 
belief or desire, or acting in some way. Reasons are facts but reasons can also be propositionally 
structured entities such as obligations, commitments, requirements, and needs. Both reasons 
and the things they are reasons for can be either facts or the intentional states such as beliefs, 
desires, and intentions. These intentional states and propositionally structured entities are 
factitive entities. A reason is a set of factitive entities (Searle, 2001), since reason are either facts 
or considerations or both. A fact is a reason only relative to the fact it is a reason for, and it is a 
reason for that fact only if it stands in an explaining relation to that fact. All good reasons 
explain, and all explaining is the giving of reasons, and reasons have overriding force in the 
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course of execution of action by an agency. Reasons are not causes, and an agent does not need 
to appeal to evidences in giving his/her reasons for action. To cite reasons for acting is to cite 
those beliefs, wants, values which are telling ones, responsible for so acting. Reasons are those 
considerations that ought to weigh with an agent because they would weigh with a perfectly 
rational agent (who has the capacity to examine critically and to improve upon initial, natural 
considerations) (Parfit, 2011). A reason is always contrasted with ‘intuition’ which is sudden 
flash and knee-jerk reaction resulting in instant approval and disapproval; the intuitive and 
emotional reaction processes do not involve reasoning.  
 
A Kantian rational agent is an agent in possession of the reflective and reflexive disposition 
leading him/her to an acquisition of a value and a capacity to respond appropriately to his/her 
normative judgments over options available. The rational agent has an ability to be guided in 
behavior by his/her normative judgment of what is right/wrong, good/bad, and 
obligatory/discretionary and to act on the basis of such normative judgments since there exists 
not only universal nature of the principles of reason but also fact of autonomy of agency (Sayre-
McCord, 2011). A human primate rather evolves through successive stages into a Kantian 
rational agent. A stimulus-response agent has a capacity to think of ‘something’ as representing 
the world in the nature and a capacity to respond to those representations with simple cognitive 
resources while a planning and strategic agent has a developed capacity to respond rather 
differentially to all such representations according to the alternative prospects of attraction and 
repulsion and also a developed capacity to respond differentially and interactively to one’s own 
representation and other’s representation with complex sophisticated cognitive resources of 
decision-making and game playing. In both agents, a capacity to represent something in the 
world as good/bad, better/worse, right/wrong, and obligatory/discretionary is lacking. A norm-
governed agent has a capacity to respond to the rules of behavior not only in terms of being 
disposed to confirm but also a capacity to enforce such rules of behavior on others in the 
interactive surroundings on the basis of commanding something giving a power of 
enforcement. A rational agent in contrast to all these three variants of agency has a capacity to 
represent something in the world as good/bad, better/worse, right/wrong and 
obligatory/discretionary because (s)he has normative concepts to deploy (Sayre-McCord, 2011). 
A concept counts as a normative concept because the criterion used in its deployment is open 
to evaluation, and the evaluation is probative with respect to whether the criteria used are 
correct. The normative concepts are essentially contestable in nature and any proposed standard 
for the application of normative concept is intelligibly challengeable as wrong. 
 
In classical literature, prominent conception of a rational agency has been taken to be either 
expressed in the conception of a ‘noumenal self’ or expressed in ‘how one should lead a satisfying 
life’. A rational agency in Aristotelian conception responds to practical reason as the overriding 
reason having normative force in the performance of action, motivated as s/he is to attaining 
any reasonable goal or a goal of the rational design of life and universe. In metaphysical 
conception of the agent in Kantian framework, the self of moral agency is a ‘noumenal’ self, 
outside time and causality - a transcendental self (Kant, 1785). In the tradition beginning from 
ancient Greeks, it has been postulated that a rational agency has an interest in either leading a 
satisfying life (a thick interest) or acting rationally (a thin interest) or both. While the richer and 
determinate ‘thick interest’ conception was developed in its earliest philosophical version by 
Aristotle, the abstract and minimal ‘thin interest’ conception of a rational agency has been 
associated with the name of Emmanuel Kant. Both interests – ‘thin interest’ and ‘thick interest’ 
- which are attributes of a rational human agency yield an argument in practical reason of a 
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person in action. A reason for intending to do something or trying to do something is, other 
things being equal, a reason for doing it. A fact is a reason for acting insofar as it bears upon 
one’s best reply to the doings or expected doings of others (Baier, 1978; Gauthier, 1987). A 
reason for desiring is a theoretical reason and a reason for acting is a practical reason for a 
person. An egotist person is a person capable of responding to theoretical reason, and a 
reasonable person is a person capable of responding to practical reason. A person endowed 
with theoretical reason is merely a necessary condition in the way of conceiving a rational 
agency who inescapably and inevitably responds to practical reason.  
 
 
2. Practical Reason and Morality: A Design of Life 
 
Moral rationalism is the view that general moral principles and moral truths are knowable a 
priori by reason alone. Such a view was defended by Plato in the ancient Greek times as well as 
Emmanuel Kant in 1785. Rationalist moralist in the past tended to regard both reason and will 
as two dimensions of the same faculty. In the rationalist view of moral obligation and duty, free 
will was “contra-causal freedom”. The philosophical moral rationalism has been prevalent in 
two forms: one using theoretical reason, and another using practical reason to act as leverage 
between the conception of rational agency and the idea of rational action. In contemporary 
times, this tradition has been carried forward by Kristine Korsgaard (1996), Richard Hare (1982) 
and Michael Smith (1994). Recently, G M Singer (2008) has provided a succinct elaboration of 
the idea of ‘rational morality’. According to Bernard Williams (2010), the Archimedean point in 
moral philosophy has been an argument in practical reason. The postulate of practical reason 
has worked as a point of leverage between the conception of rational agency and the idea of 
rational action.  
 
Socrates was one of the first to seek a rational design of life. The ancient Greeks subscribed to 
teleology. An explanation which consists of a description in terms of the end, result and goal 
aimed at is called a teleological explanation of action. Such an explanation posits that an action 
is performed with a purpose in mind, with the intention of bringing about some state of affairs 
of the world and is directed toward some goal. In the teleological conception, a rational design 
of life was considered to be contingent on rational action, and the rational action was the action 
of man of virtues. A virtuous man with a background of proper education and upbringing had 
the capacity of performing good action, and good action led him to seek a rational design of life. 
A rational agency endowed with the faculty of practical reason was therefore located in a man of 
virtue – virtue ethics.  
A long journey beginning from virtue ethics has been completed. It is as yet considered a 
reasonable postulate about human nature that affirms that (wo) man deliberates, prior to acting, 
from other-regarding concerns and perspectives, so as to accomplish something good or 
something right or something obligatory. When our reasons to do something are stronger than 
our reasons to do anything else, this act is what we have most reason to do, and may be what we 
should, or ought to, or must do (Parfit, 2011, p. 1). If a person has a reason for acting then there 
must be something good or right about what s/he is doing. A rational agency being capable of 
responding to practical reason generally follows certain norms (with a scope of revision in the 
light of new facts and evidences) - a set of moral practices. Practical reason as a faculty has a 
capacity to motivate agents to act, and thereby, it does determine the content of morality. The 
rationalist moralist asserts that practical reason has a normative force because it is the justifying 
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reason for action with an overriding force. It is the ‘reason for action’ - the reason for 
performing action. A rational agent acts as (s)he does by virtue of his/her judgment of what is 
and what is not worth doing. A rational agent is in essence a moral agent, and practical 
reasoning is an essential aspect of a moral agency (Kant, 1785). A failure to act on a moral 
injunction has been considered to be a form of irrational behavior.  
 
A practical reason is a normative reason for action, that is, it is some fact that counts in favor of 
the agent’s performing that action. Practical reason is the faculty of reflection and deliberation 
of an autonomous agency. Such reasons are facts that ought to be considerations for someone 
to do something, provided she is adequately informed. It is understood to be our capacity to 
reason from normative belief to practical conclusions, and the normative force is the action-
guiding force. It is nothing but reason that is guiding action. It is conscious intention and mental 
deliberation towards a choice of what ought to do and how ought to act. Practical reason is 
rationality in action, which is always a matter of an agent consciously reasoning in time, under 
the presupposition of freedom, about what to do now or in the future (Searle, 2001). Practical 
reason is the faculty of reflection and deliberation of an autonomous human agent; it is in the 
nature of being justifying reason for regarding a course of action as good, right and obligatory 
(Keenan, 1984). Practical reason plays a substantial role in self-regulation of a rational agency. 
Practical reason is posited to be an externalist reason in the nature of being justifying reason 
with overriding force for regarding a course of action as good or right or obligatory for 
achieving a better state of affairs of the world; it is a moral reason. Practical reasons tell a person 
what s/he just plain ought to do, that is, what s/he ought to do, all things considered. A human 
primate is a rational personal agency and such a rational agent is essentially and unfailingly a 
moral agent in the Kantian system of understanding. This has been considered and defended as 
a universal theoretical philosophical premise.  
 
Rationalist conception of morality insists that we always have most reason to do and to act to 
do our duty, and bring the stamp of self-responsibility to bear on our action, and it could not be 
rational to act in any way that we believe to be wrong (quoted in Parfit, 2011, p. 141). It is since 
eighteenth and nineteenth century until a couple of decades back that this proposition about 
concord between agency and reason has been carried forward in moral philosophy. An agent 
has the power to affect the state of the world by producing action; the cause of actions is not an 
event but a thing and such a thing with a power to cause actions is the human agent. In order to 
account for a rational agency, there is always a need to postulate a self that combines the 
capacities of rationality and agency. It is the self (something that intervenes between thought 
and action) which is the source of generation of an ethical disposition (Searle, 1983). An ethical 
disposition is the intentionality and disposition to bring about a change in the state of affairs of 
the world. To act intentionally is to be prepared to give reasons to justify the action. An action 
is creation in the sense of altering the physical state of the world; it is an intentional 
performance and movement of human beings.  
 
Morality is a life-guide with a marked social dimension to it, and it is a belief in the objectivity of 
morality that an appeal is made to reason. Morality is grounded in rationality in the sense of 
being possessed of not only a special reason-giving force (a positive force) but also action-
guiding (a normative force). It motivates a person to act because it imbues the reason-for-action 
with an overriding force. Both rationality and morality are normative. While rationality requires 
the recommending normativity, morality consists of the demanding normativity (Schulte, 2011). 
The rationality judgments are action-guiding in the sense of recommending an action while 
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morality judgments are demanding a course of action. Morality is crucially a matter of 
disposition of a rational agency who responds to practical reason. The dispositions to want 
certain things, to react in certain ways to other people, and to their actions, to use such notion 
as obligations, and to promote certain outcomes like justice are ethical dispositions. An agency 
requires a number of disposition in which resolution is one of the disposition required for 
agency (Wallace, 1999). The exercise of resolve is a constitutive habit of agency (Raz, 1986, p. 
372). Reproduction of ethical dispositions in a person is conducive to preservation of ethical 
values – values of norms-following. In specific circumstances, morality is but not merely a 
matter of disposition; it is also a matter of practice by a human person. A moral practice is 
constituted by actions which are motivated by reasons to “care” about inter-personal desire-
independent other-regarding interests and “norms-following” by a human person. It is claimed 
that such actions are necessarily performed by a rational agency responding to practical reason.  
 
 
3. Apathy and Moral Deficits: Dual Constraints 
 
Both Thomas Nagel and John Rawls, prominent modern moral philosophers in their own 
respective rights, have variously asserted that our moral theories have been ancient and our 
ethical theory has been in infancy for quite a long time (Parfit, 2011), because these theories 
could not address a number of queries with a proper answer. It is only during the last two 
decades that the ethical theory has been attempting to come out of the infancy, though 
unsuccessfully.  
 
Whereas formerly ethicists were concerned mainly with the merits of teleological versus deontological moral 
systems, with the discovery and application of moral rules and with the logical structure of moral 
judgments, nowadays many have devoted most of their energies and resources to analyzing and answering 
the question “Why be moral?” ……………………………….…….. in the past twenty-five years 
or so (Keenan, 1984, p.3).  
 
It is not that the idea of a reason for acting has been easy to understand; it has rather been 
frightfully difficult to answer as to what is a reason for action. This is what Phillipa Foot also 
claimed once (quoted in Cullity and Gaut, 1997; Searle, 2001, p. 97). This is why a number of 
moral theorists have come forward to opine that practical reason and morality is no more to be 
considered as co-existential (Foot, 1972; Harman, 1978). In the arena of rationality, the moot 
question from a singular first-person point of view is: “what do I have most reason to do?” in 
the arena of morality, the significant issue from a singular first-person point of view is: “what 
ought I morally to do?” there are cases where the answers do diverge. Given the divergence in 
answers to the questions raised from the singular first-person point of view, reason loses the 
capacity to determine the content of morality and the capacity to motivate the agents to act. In 
such a case, morality is undermined. The self-interested “I” and other-interested “I’ may have 
discord with each other. In such cases, the empirical observations do not accord well with the 
theoretical and conceptual model of the rationalist morality and moral rationalism.  
 
Why be moral? Whether it is rational to be moral? Is it not possible that we could rationally act 
wrongly? Recently, Philippa Foot (1972) opined that a man may reject morality without being 
irrational, in-calculative or inconsistent. Immorality does not involve irrationality. Gilbert 
Harman (1978) asserts that if a person’s interest and principles diverge and differs with others, 
he may have no reason to accept other’s morality. In other words, there are no substantive 
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moral demands everyone may have reason to accept. According to Phillip Petit and Michael 
Smith (1993), there are many situations where practical unreason ensues only because there are 
imbalances in various combinations between the weight of deliberation (weighing the 
considerations about values) and forces of desideration (desires, disposition) for a rational 
human agency. In the past, David Hume (1751) could go a step further to generalize that 
morality is determined by sentiments and moral judgments have an essentially emotional, 
sentimental and non-rational character to them. In ancient Greece, Aristotle allowed for a 
vicious man and a man suffering from weakness-of-will to be out of the ethical system of the 
co-existentiality of practical reason and morality. The mythical human characters of the antiquity 
the amoralist, the Callicles, and the skeptic, the Pyrrhonians were also considered out of the ethical 
system, despite it that they reasoned very well and were of course rational agents. In general, the 
universality claim of practical reason has been presumed to fail in cases of weakness of will, 
compulsion, wantonness and caprice due to ignorance, bias, inferential error and illogic. These 
have been standard instances of failure of practical reason enumerated in the past literature.  
 
In the modern real world as it obtains today, it is often asserted that the reason has nearly lost 
the capacity to determine the moral practices in case of a large number of human beings ala` 
persons. It is asserted that the rational importance of a personal identity is often lost in case of a 
large number of human beings in the modern world. The empirical researches paint a dismal 
portrayal of the role of reason in morality. These argue that practical reason is a fiction lacking 
empirical roots, and therefore, it has no role to play in guiding an action – a thinning of the air 
around possibility of a moral action. In the empirical setting of our modern world with the 
system of political coordination through “democracy”, the co-existentiality often gets broken. 
Joseph Schumpeter (1942, p. 262) opined long back that in a democracy, typical citizens may 
possess a wide range of cognitive skills but they lack motivational virtues. They often act 
without virtue. They lack virtues required to employ cognitive skills in ways necessary for 
effective deliberative engagement in a democratic arena. They are insensitive to truths. Since 
acquiring and gathering information and knowledge involve costs in terms of consummation of 
time, money and resources, they prefer rational ignorance which is a phenomenon resulting 
from a lack of motivation by citizens to be knowledgeable and informed. They succumb to their 
primal and primitive passionate instincts. Asymmetry in the dissemination and acquisition of 
information across citizens combined with lack of motivation to employ the cognitive skills 
mars the deliberative reasoning process. The cases of moral hazards in the ethos of information 
asymmetry and failures of patron-client relations are widely explained with the help of 
observational categories in the discipline of economics. In the material world of capitalist 
framework of society and economy, there are more observed cases of vices ruling the roost than 
virtue in relations among humans.  
 
Contemporaneous social psychology researches propound the paradigm of ‘automaticity’ in 
human action in day-to-day affairs. In psychological researches, the personality of a person is 
treated to be integrally linked with at least three things: functioning of the prefrontal cortex of the 
brain, functioning of the corti-costriatal brain circuitry, and process of the coupling of external 
information of environment with brain. Neuroscience claims that the auto-activation deficit is a 
specific brain-related disorder contributing to the agential apathy, goal neglect and impulsivity. 
In claiming this, the neuroscience bears the blame of being narrow in the sense of treating mind 
as consisting of purely material categories of brain only while philosophers treat mind as being 
much broader than the material categories of brain. Be that as it may. Why do passions inform 
the decision-making? Why does impulsivity characterize a majority of human characters? Why 
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does automaticity in the form of mostly non-conscious automatic responses to environmental 
stimuli characterize the profile of a majority of actions? Such questions have been answered 
under the programmes of the modern social psychology researches by pointing to the anomalies 
in the working of human brain.  
 
To begin with, a brain thinks; a human brain thinks over the thought of the mind as well. Being 
a conscious organ, the human brain makes a coupling with body. What is unique about this 
organ is that it co-ordinates not only our physical actions but also regulates our unconscious 
body processes, such as digestion and breathing. A human brain needs data and all such data 
constitute the information for brain. Information is encoded, transmitted and stored. 
Knowledge is a store of information which an agent gains as a result of interaction with the 
world. Information is a property of representations that are meaningful to some subjects – 
intentional. It is presumed to be meaningful by virtue of having some appropriate connection to 
its objects.  
 
The word ‘information’ has been given different meanings by various writers in the general field of 
information theory. It is likely that at least a number of these will prove sufficiently useful in certain 
applications to deserve further study and permanent recognition. It is hardly to be expected that a single 
concept of information would satisfactorily account for the numerous possible applications of this general 
field (Shannon, 1993, p. 180). 
 
Be that as it may. A brain without information, be that external or internal, is a blank slate. 
Abstract information is all there in the environment of the world, and it is the coupling of 
environment with human brain that effectuates the transfer of the information – a set of 
symbols, signals and messages constituting data as facts and knowledge. In everyday usage, 
information is facts acquired from observation, instruction and study and it constitutes the 
knowledge. Both epistemology and semantics postulate that such data, facts, knowledge and 
information are conveyed from world to mind - transference from environment to agents – a 
coupling. Information as well-formed, factual, meaningful instructional data is transferable 
through coupling and conveyed from the physical, biological, non-intentional world to 
cognitive, mental, intentional states of human agents. It is conveyed from the biological and 
physical world – non-intentional entities – to our minds and cognitive systems – the intentional 
entity.  
 
In human brain, the Prefrontal Cortex and Corticostriatal Brain Circuitry are ideal places to look 
for neural correlates of abstract information (Kaplan, et al., 2001). It is not to deny that a given 
pattern of information affects many brain circuits, since processing of information is 
orchestrated in many different brain systems and therefore, the neural correlates of abstract 
information are to be found in many brain circuits. The role of Prefrontal Cortex is but vital 
since it is in direct contact with a wide array of sub-cortical structures that also process 'internal' 
information such as motivational state. The Prefrontal Cortex provides a venue in which 
information from distant brain systems can interact through relatively local circuitry. It is the 
Prefrontal Cortex that contributes to those cognitive capacities that distinguish humans from 
animals. The prefrontal cortex is the brain's executive. The Cortex of brain has access to and the 
means to influence processing in all major forebrain systems. This Cortex of brain seems to 
have a central role in cognitive control. The Prefrontal Cortex provides a means to synthesize 
the diverse information related to a given goal of a human agent. The Corticostriatal is a brain 
circuitry that is also thought to regulate not only the cognitive but also the decisional and 
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behavioral tendencies in human beings. The circuitries integrate aspects of cognitive, 
sensorimotor, and motivational information (Groenewegen et al., 1997). Corticostriatal 
circuitries are important not only for basic incentive motivation and instrumental learning 
functions but also for the higher order cognitive control over decisions, actions, and goal-
directed behaviors that can either promote or impair physical and mental health.  
 
Apathy is a quantitative reduction of voluntary, goal-directed behaviors. The capacity of the 
frontal cortex to select, initiate, maintain and shift programs of actions is impaired. The absence 
of cognitive control which is a reflection of malfunction is related with the lesion and damage to 
the Prefrontal Cortex of brain. The clinical signs grouped under the concept of apathy are a 
common feature of lesions of prefrontal cortex and dysfunctions of corti-costriatal brain 
circuitry (and basal ganglia). The underlying mechanisms responsible for apathy are to be 
grouped into three subtypes of disrupted processing: ‘emotional–affective’, ‘cognitive’ and ‘auto-
activation’. Apathy due to the disruption of ‘emotional–affective’ processing refers to the 
inability to establish the necessary linkage between emotional–affective signals and the ongoing 
or forthcoming behavior. Apathy due to the disruption of ‘cognitive’ processing refers to 
difficulties in elaborating the plan of actions necessary for the ongoing or forthcoming behavior. 
Impulsivity is typically envisioned as inefficient, un-adaptive or suboptimal reaction and is often 
reflected in manifestations of rapid action, quick decision making, and hasty reward seeking. In 
both humans and monkeys, it is now clear that those individuals exhibiting relatively high 
naturally occurring impulsivity exhibit poor working memory capabilities. Perhaps the basic 
mechanism mediating this relationship is that poor working memory leads to deficiencies in 
developing and maintaining goal-directed plans related to behavior—the result being a more 
myopic behavioral phenotype. A malfunction of brain leads to apathy, impulsivity and goal-
neglect by a person.  
 
Apathy, impulsivity and goal neglect shows uneven distribution of internal information of brain. 
The damage to the pre-frontal cortex leads to apathy - a quantitative reduction of voluntary, 
goal-directed behaviors. An inconsistency in the corti-costriatal brain circuitry is a reflection of 
failures of processing of reward-related information and regulation of impulsive decisions and 
actions and the inability to self-activate thoughts and self-initiate actions may simply be a 
reflection of the uneven distribution of internal information among human population. Extreme 
form of such malfunction is found in a psychopath. Early socioeconomic disadvantage directly 
account for variation in the adult functionality of brain circuitries—specifically ‘corticostriatal brain 
circuitries. Early socioeconomic disadvantage is associated with alterations in several cognitive 
functions in adulthood, particularly those that are presumably supported by prefrontal and 
networked cortical control systems (Kaplan et al. 2001), leading to apathy and impulsivity in 
human actions. Parents of lower socioeconomic backgrounds tend on average to report that 
child development is a process that unfolds naturally. They perceive that that it is not necessary 
to do more than provide basic supports, including food, shelter, and comforts to children. Such 
practices may lead to asymmetric distribution of information and knowledge across the 
divergent socio-economic classes of people. Though information, technically speaking can never 
be false, it might be misleading in such an environment of asymmetric distribution. The uneven 
distribution of external information of the environment among the human population may lead 
to apathy, impulsivity and goal neglect, which may be the direct result of uneven distribution of 
socio-economic advantages and disadvantages in the civil society.  
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Apathy, impulsivity and goal-neglect is often the result a specific kind of disorder of human 
brain called the ‘auto-activation deficit’; it is the disruption of ‘auto-activation’ processing which 
manifests in the inability to self-activate thoughts and self-initiate actions. It is the lesion and 
damage of prefrontal cortex and inconsistency in the working of the corticostriatal brain 
circuitry that often leads to the ‘auto-activation deficit’ in human beings. There is superficial 
appearance of normality in a human agency suffering from the natural lesion and the accidental 
damage to prefrontal cortex and dysfunctions in the corticostriatal brain circuitry (and basal 
ganglia) (Prinz, 2007). An agency suffering from the natural lesion and the accidental damage to 
prefrontal cortex can perceive, make bodily movement, and appear remarkably normal in casual 
conversation. The agency suffers from very little impairment in the memory. They have but 
difficulty in sustaining attention, in keeping 'on task', and seem to act on whims and impulses 
without regard to future consequences. They suffer from 'goal neglect' (Duncan et al., 1996). 
They simply react to their environment with whatever behaviors are strongly associated with the 
cues that are immediately present. They become impulsive. They exhibit apathy.  
 
An agency that is incapable of judging what is best and also incapable of forming the intention 
to do what is best is pathologically afflicted. In a series of recent neuro-imaging studies, a neo-
Humean sentimentalist account of morality has been invoked to establish that there has been 
domination of automatic emotional processes over deliberative reasoning process. Human 
behaviour is posited to be a struggle between affective and cognitive systems in the neural 
anatomy of brain, and it is argued that the decision-making draws on the emotions even when 
reason is clearly involved. Affective systems of mind embody not only emotions such as anger 
and jealousy, but also drive states such as hunger and sexual desire, and the motivational states 
such as anger and physical pain that motivate us to aggress and take steps to ease the pain. In 
the neural anatomy, the affective system has primary control over behaviour, but the 
deliberative system chooses which behaviour to implement. It does this by trading off its 
objectives against the cost of exerting cognitive effort or willpower so as to influence the 
affective system’s choice. In such cases, moral judgments of human agents consist in intuitive 
response and emotional reactions (Prinz, 2007). This is the upshot of an emerging field in 
economics, going in the name of neuro-economics (Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005). 
Extreme form of moral judgments consisting in intuitive response and emotional reactions is 
found in a psychopath. A modern psychopath – our best-known real-life example of amoral 
agent – is of course out of the ethical system. A psychopath has a brain and capacity to reason 
but lacks affective feeling of guilt, remorse and empathy. A psychopath lacks emotion, intuition 
and the ability to grasp moral judgements. A psychopath does understand but not care at all 
about what is wrong and right. A psychopath cannot distinguish violations of moral norms from 
conventional norms.  
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Rationalist conception of morality insists that we always have most reason to act to bring about 
and attain something good, something righteous and something obligatory. We act with a sense 
of our duty. We bring the stamp of self-responsibility to bear on our action. It could never be 
rational to act in any way that we believe to be wrong. If a person has a reason for acting then 
there must be something good or right about what s/he is doing. A person is a rational agency 
and (s)he being capable of responding to practical reason generally follows certain norms (with a 
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scope of revision in the light of new facts and evidences) - a set of moral practices. A rational 
agent (in contrast to all variants of thinking and acting entity, for example, ape or chimpanzee) 
has a capacity to represent something in the world as good/bad, better/worse, right/wrong and 
obligatory/discretionary because (s)he has normative concepts to deploy. It is a belief in the 
objectivity of morality that an appeal is made to reason. Morality is grounded in rationality in the 
sense of being possessed of not only a special reason-giving force (a positive force) but also 
action-guiding (a normative force). It motivates a person to act because it imbues the reason-
for-action with an overriding force. Practical reason as a faculty has a capacity to motivate 
agents to act, and thereby, it does determine the content of morality.  
 
There are but exceptions to rationalist conception of morality so far as real-life observations go. 
A rational agency who is already capable of exercising practical reasoning and who has also been 
brought up with background of a proper education still fail to exhibit an ethical disposition, and 
consequently, a moral practice. Such moral failures and deficits do have a relation with a minor 
though often disregarded malfunction of human brain. In addition to education and upbringing 
of a human agent, the status of the health of brain of an otherwise rational person is quite 
significant. What has been sidelined from the mainstream debate has been simple: a person may 
suffer from impulsivity caused by irregularity in the information-perception refinement function 
of sense-organs. A person may also suffer from the phenomena of goal-neglect and apathy as a 
result of lesion and damage afflicting the brain – an integral constitutive part of mind. In both 
cases, an otherwise rational agent suffers from what is technically called the ‘psychic akinesia’ and 
in ordinary language the ‘auto-activation deficit’. Neuroscience claims that the auto-activation 
deficit is a specific brain-related disorder contributing to the agential apathy, goal neglect and 
impulsivity. In case of a rational agency suffering from ‘auto-activation deficit’, there is a break-
down in the co-existentiality between practical reason and morality. 
 
A psychopath reveals an acute form of apathy and impulsivity in action. Apathetic disposition 
and impulsive action built upon utter disregard for moral judgments and principles are but not 
infrequent on part of a large number of human persons in contemporaneous time. Such 
disorders put a heavy burden on the processing of internal informational resources and coupling 
of external information with the brain. The capacity to select, initiate, maintain and shift 
programs of actions is impaired and a quantitative reduction of voluntary, goal-directed 
behaviors is observed. Apathy and impulsivity leads to aberrations in moral practices on part of 
an otherwise rational agency. Contemporaneous social psychology researches propound the 
paradigm of ‘automaticity’ in human action in day-to-day affairs. What is arguable is simple; 
there is a need of integration of postulates of ethical theory with researches in philosophical 
psychology so as to account for moral deficit and failures on part of multiple variants of a 
psychopath - our best-known real-life example of an amoral human agent – in 
contemporaneous times.  
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